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Support for the EU has fallen in several European countries since the beginning of the financial crisis. Han
Werts, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers assess the political effects of this rise in
Euroscepticism using data from the European Social Survey. Their analysis shows that the
probability of voting for radical right-wing parties increases substantially with levels of
Euroscepticism.
In many European countries, a notable decline in political and public support for the European
Union has been observed. There is also some evidence from Eurobarometer studies that the recent
economic crises in Greece and Cyprus and the unstable economic situation in the other Southern
European countries has decreased support for the European Union further and vice versa has
increased Euroscepticism.
As Figure 1 shows, the populations of Greece, Italy and Spain contained only small proportions that
evaluated membership of the EU as ‘a bad thing’, certainly compared to the UK: they actually were
among the lowest in Europe, with figures below 10 per cent from the turn of the century on.
However, since the start of the economic crisis, these proportions have increased in Italy and Spain
to 17 per cent in 2011, and even to 33 per cent in Greece. However, Euroscepticism is also now
more widespread in countries like France, the UK and Germany than it was 10 years ago. In 2005,
the popular rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands showed that
numerous citizens are hesitant about supporting further European integration.
Figure 1: Percentage of citizens that view membership of the EU as a ‘bad thing’
Source: Eurobarometers 2001-2011 – Eurobarometer interactive search system
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All across Europe, we have witnessed radical right parties successfully mobilising national identity considerations
against the European Union. In several European Parliamentary elections in recent years, radical right-wing parties
in particular have used the rhetoric of anti-EU sentiment and, paradoxically, gained seats in the European
Parliament. These parties see further integration into a political European Union as a threat to the sovereignty of the
nation state: nearly all radical right-wing parties agree that the EU is bad and should be either reformed
fundamentally or abolished. Yet, the issue of how relevant Euroscepticism is for the general EU public in terms of
voting for radical right-wing parties in contemporary Europe has received little empirical attention in previous
studies.
In a recent study, we focused on the relationship between Euroscepticism and radical right-wing voting in national
elections in 18 European countries between 2002 and 2008. We took advantage of high-quality cross-national
European data selected in the European Social Survey programme. These are surveys that are conducted under
the highest scientific standards. We included only those countries with a radical right-party. First, we focused on
social cleavages in radical right voting, e.g. social class and religiosity. Second, we examined the effects of several
contextual characteristics, such as the economic situation and the level of migration. Third, we took diverse socio-
political attitudes into account, among which we had a focal interest in the role of Euroscepticism. We tested
whether Euroscepticism affects voting for the radical right, over and beyond other relevant attitudes of the voters
that have previously been proposed to determine radical right-wing voting.
We found evidence that Euroscepticism indeed contributes to the explanation of voting for the radical right, beyond
the huge effects of perceived ethnic threat and political distrust. Euroscepticism turned out to be a key political
motive, actually the third-strongest socio-political determinant, to explain radical right-wing voting in Europe. The
effect of Euroscepticism is, however, relatively smaller than of perceived ethnic threat and political distrust.
Moreover, while perceived ethnic threat does well in explaining why particular social categories, i.e. lower educated
people, manual workers, unemployed people and non-churchgoers are more likely to vote for the radical right than
others; Euroscepticism hardly explains these differences. Figure 2 shows the relationship between Euroscepticism
and the probability of voting for a radical right-wing party.
Figure 2: Probability of voting for a radical right-wing party by level of Euroscepticism
Source: European Social Survey (2002–2008); own calculations (based on MLWin parameters).
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What do these findings imply? One of the expectations may be that political parties that identify and magnify political
issues (possibly) indicating institutional weaknesses of the EU – and on this issue radical right-wing parties are
dominant – may get even more electoral ground, since the euro and the EU in general are suffering from economic
weakness. Whereas some mainstream political parties tend to support greater integration, political parties on the
flanks emphasise that more powers should be returned to national governments. Moreover, we expect that
Euroscepticism, contemporarily fed by the economic and financial crisis around the euro and political debates on the
EU budget, as in the recent cases of Greece and Cyprus, may attract more voters to radical right-wing parties, as
Euroscepticism may rise even further.
However, radical right parties cannot be overly optimistic with this scenario. The Dutch 2012 elections have shown
that playing the anti-Eurosceptic card during economic hardship may function like a boomerang. Economic crises
tend to shift the focus to the economic domain, stimulating a confrontation between right and left-wing politics in the
classical meaning: between those in favour of austerity measures and those opposing it. Previous research has
suggested that the radical right gains less from economic downturns when the political salience of the economy in
left-right terms increases, at the cost of cultural and identity related concerns. Still, our research shows that radical
right-wing parties gain electorally by Euroscepticism. We expect that due to further EU enlargements and increased
migration from new EU member states to the richer EU member states, because of the crisis around the euro, and
because of debates around the budget of the EU, Euroscepticism will turn out to be an even stronger determinant of
radical right-wing voting in the near future.
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